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COMMON INTERESTS AND INTEGRATION 
REBECCA BROWN* 
On this occasion of the 50th anniversary of Cooper v. Aaron,1 David 
Strauss has eloquently called upon us to consider how a piece of history—and 
not even very ancient history at that—can come to serve as authority for a 
principle that is irreconcilable with the historical events that defined it.  The 
meaning, importance, and historical role of Brown v. Board of Education2 and 
its successor, Cooper v. Aaron, in our nation’s history now appear to be a 
matter of art, not nature.  But the artist has an obligation to defend an 
interpretation of a subject as important as our nation’s commitment to equality, 
and Professor Strauss has done just that.  He positions us to embrace an 
understanding along the trajectory toward racial equality to which Brown itself 
was committed, as were the legal and social cultures that made Brown their 
icon. 
This Essay takes a closer look at one of the implications of Professor 
Strauss’s strong defense of Brown in the face of a modern tug-o’-war over its 
legacy.  The dispute centers around whether Brown should be understood to 
condemn all government considerations of race, as some modern readers 
claim,3 or whether the heart of the Brown holding was a rejection of racial 
classifications that contribute to societal inequality, as others, including 
Professor Strauss, maintain.4  In this Essay, I consider whether the Brown 
Court, and before it, the lawyers who framed the question in Brown, were right 
to speak so absolutely and forcefully about racial separation itself, rather than 
insisting, more contextually, that separate public facilities be required to 
provide equality of resources.  In hindsight, we now have come to see that the 
framers of the separate-is-inherently-unequal principle unwittingly laid the 
 
* Allen Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.  This Essay was prepared for presentation at the 
Richard J. Childress Memorial Lecture at Saint Louis University School of Law on October 4–5, 
2007.  The Author served as law clerk to Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall in the 1985 Term. 
 1. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
 2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 3. See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in 
Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1470 (2004) (“Today, many 
understand Brown to have ended the era of segregation in America by declaring the constitutional 
principle that government may not classify on the basis of race.”). 
 4. See id. at 1547. 
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groundwork for the later claim, seen most recently in Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,5 that the Constitution 
requires color blindness.6  Did they make a mistake? 
At the outset, it is worth considering why the Supreme Court might have 
spoken as it did in Brown, using broad, abstract terms that perhaps invite 
dissociation from the factual context from which they arose.  The first thing to 
remember is that, despite its status as an ostensibly co-equal branch of 
government, the Supreme Court is extremely limited in the weapons it has to 
lend authority to its decisions.  Effectively, it has only two.  First, it has the 
personae of its nine individual Justices—their personal endorsement of the 
positions they take.  Second, it has the words they choose to declare and 
defend their decisions. 
In Brown, the Justices were keenly aware that they needed every bit of 
ammunition they had, if they were going to call an end to segregation in public 
school.  Historians have documented how some members of the Court, under 
Chief Justice Earl Warren, labored to achieve unanimity in its decision in 
Brown, to be authored by the Chief Justice and joined by all eight Associate 
Justices.7  It was not at all a foregone conclusion that all nine Justices could 
bring themselves to cast such a controversial vote.8  As Professor Strauss has 
described, all of the Justices probably abhorred the practice of segregation and 
its attendant inequalities, but it was quite another matter to go on record as 
holding that the Supreme Court of the United States had the legitimate 
authority to strike down the practice as a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.9  The Chief Justice recognized the need for mustering as much 
authority as possible and employed his considerable leadership skills to draw 
the Justices to a unanimous decision.10  In this way they deliberately used their 
personae in the grandest flourish they knew. 
When it came to writing the opinion, Chief Justice Warren also took the 
path of maximal impact.  Invoking the force of principle, he chose broad, 
 
 5. 551 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
 6. Id. at 2756 n. 14 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J. 
dissenting)); id. at 2768 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Disfavoring a color-blind interpretation of the 
Constitution, the dissent would give school boards a free hand to make decisions on the basis of 
race—an approach reminiscent of that advocated by segregationists in Brown v. Board of 
Education . . . .”); see William J. Rich, Brown, Dominance,  and Diversity, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 
311, 324 (2004). 
 7. See MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE 
SUPREME COURT, 1936–1961 204 (1994) (describing Justice Frankfurter’s efforts to promote 
unanimity) [hereinafter TUSHNET]. 
 8. Id. at 209–10 (describing Justice Douglas’s perception after the conference that there 
was only a bare majority to hold segregation unconstitutional). 
 9. See generally David A. Strauss, Little Rock and the Legacy of Brown, 52 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 1065 (2008). 
 10. See TUSHNET, supra note 7, at 210–11. 
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ringing declarations rather than incremental, narrow statements to resolve 
Linda Brown’s case.  Rejecting the idea that the constitutional question could 
turn on the “tangible” factors affecting the quality of education, the Court 
relied, instead, on “the effect of segregation itself on public education.”11  It 
found, of course, that “[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently 
unequal.”12  There was perhaps a bit of an incongruence between this 
seemingly theoretical, abstract declaration and the evidence that the Court 
mustered to support it, which was an empirical link between the practice of 
segregation in the schools of the time and a resulting appearance and fact of 
inequality.13 
When it came to application of this principle in the subsequent litigation in 
Little Rock, the Court faced a direct attack on its authority.14  The opposition 
forces were not limiting themselves to the traditional weapons of challenge to a 
court’s authority: words and argument.  They were also raising the specter of 
physical violence.15  The Court needed its strongest possible defense.  But 
what would that mean for the least dangerous branch?  The President could call 
in the 101st Airborne—and he did.16  The Governor could call out the National 
Guard—and he did.17  But what did the Court have to defend its holding and 
the rule of law?  A few rather doughy marshals guarding the entrance to the 
Supreme Court building in Washington, D.C. would not be much help. 
So the Court had to do one better than what it did in Brown.  Not only 
would the opinion in Cooper v. Aaron also be unanimous, providing a 
supportive vote from each of the nine Justices in favor of the author’s opinion, 
as in Brown,18 but the Cooper opinion would also be jointly authored by all 
nine Justices19—not signed by one and joined by the other eight—laying the 
credibility of all nine Justices on the line for every word in the opinion in a 
very personal and direct way.  This was the first and only time in the history of 
the Court that the Justices made this gesture of solidarity. 
In addition to maximizing the force of their personae in this way, the 
Justices also chose their words for the opinion in Cooper in a way that 
maximized their effect, surpassing even Brown.  While many thought that 
Brown itself had stretched the Court’s authority to (or for some, even beyond) 
 
 11. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954). 
 12. Id. at 494. 
 13. See id. at n.11 (citing evidence that separation of children by race generated feelings of 
inferiority in the minority race). 
 14. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). 
 15. Id. at 13. 
 16. Id. at 12. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Brown, 347 U.S. at 466. 
 19. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 4. 
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its limits,20 Cooper needed more.  So here, not only did the Court offer its 
contested interpretation of the Constitution, but it went so far as to claim for its 
interpretation the status of the Constitution itself as “the supreme law of the 
land.”21  Thus, the Justices employed the weapon of language to conscript the 
power of the Constitution in support of their ruling.  Ending the opinion with a 
further stroke of almost ecclesiastical grandiosity, the joint opinion declared, 
“Our constitutional ideal of equal justice under law is thus made a living 
truth.”22 
These semantic indulgences have cost the Court.  They have led critics to 
cry out against judicial supremacy,23 and have led subsequent interpreters, 
including the Roberts Court in Parents Involved, to pluck some of the abstract 
language out of its 1950s context to support a claim that the Constitution 
forbids any government consciousness of race, regardless of its relationship to 
equality.24  Perhaps if the Warren Court had foreseen the future, it would have 
been a bit more restrained in using its two rather meager weapons against the 
violent stand being taken against desegregation. 
If the Court had foreseen the future, it might have said in Brown, not that 
separate facilities are “inherently unequal,” but something more lawyerly, like 
“forced separation with the purpose and effect of maintaining racial hierarchy 
and perpetuating gross disparities in power, opportunity and resources, is 
unequal.”  Not so ringing, but more accurately reflective of what the Court was 
clearly saying in Brown. 
If the Court had foreseen the future, it might have said in Cooper, not that 
its holdings are the supreme law of the land, but something more precise, like 
“traditional adherence to the rule of law requires that outsiders refrain from 
intentionally interfering with a party’s compliance with a valid court order.”  
Not so powerful, but less vulnerable to accusations of overreaching. 
But we have to remember that it was not a time for toned-down rhetoric.  
There was rioting in the streets.  There were children whose lives were 
threatened as they tried to go to school in compliance with a federal court 
order.  There were claims of entitlement to violate the law.  The Court called a 
special session in September, before the start of the new Term, to address the 
 
 20. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 
AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY 67 
(1982); JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY 159 (2005). 
 21. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18. 
 22. Id. at 20. 
 23. See, e.g., WALLACE MENDELSON, SUPREME COURT STATECRAFT: THE RULE OF LAW 
AND MEN 156–57 (1985). 
 24. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 
2738, 2767–68 (2007). 
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crisis in Little Rock.25  And so emerged the statements of high constitutional 
principle that, half a century later, have come back to haunt us. 
The irony of what has happened to the legacy of Brown is breathtaking.  
Perhaps most poignant of all, under the current view of equal protection 
espoused by the Supreme Court, it now seems to be the case that state and 
federal governments are constitutionally free to do whatever they think 
prudent, to help virtually any other group—farmers, athletes, oil companies—
to better its lot in society.  The one group that elected representatives are 
constitutionally precluded from explicitly helping is the one group whose 
continuing, disproportionately high representation in the lower echelons of 
society can be traced directly to treatment they received because of the color of 
their skin.  That twisted understanding of the Constitution’s promise of 
equality is a far cry from the courageous principle espoused in Brown and 
Cooper. 
Let us be clear.  Fifty years later, school integration is still an elusive ideal, 
and poverty is still undeniably linked to race.  Yet the Supreme Court tells us 
that the principal lasting contribution of the landmark equal-protection decree 
of Brown is a requirement that government institutions leave all deplorable 
racial disparities as they find them. 
In the face of this stunning characterization of the legacy of Brown, some 
have begun to question the broadside attack on the segregation laws that the 
NAACP devised and that the Supreme Court accepted in Brown.26  Seeing the 
disappointing failure of Brown’s legacy to achieve its objective of school 
integration, much less full equality, many have suggested that we might have 
been better off if the Court had simply reaffirmed the “separate but equal” 
doctrine and directed its power toward requiring the states to bring the poorer 
schools into greater parity with the more affluent schools.27 
I would like to suggest that this repudiation of Brown is not the right 
response to the perversion of its legacy, for one short reason and one longer 
reason.  The short one is that the revisionist interpretation of Brown is just 
demonstrably wrong, for all the reasons Professor Strauss has identified and 
more.  It is hard to imagine why, for example, the Court would have reached 
out and exposed itself to ridicule for citing to the controversial “doll studies” to 
support the proposition that segregation as practiced at the time leads to 
 
 25. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 14; see also Little Rock School District Central High School 
Desegregation Timeline: 1958, http://lrsdorg.nexpoint.net/TempPics/history/deseg58.pdf. 
 26. PETER F. LAU, FROM THE GRASSROOTS TO THE SUPREME COURT: BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 369 (2004). 
 27. Id. at 370–74; see also Gary Orfield and Chungmei Lee, Brown at 50: King’s Dream or 
Plessy’s Nightmare?, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY (2004), available at 
http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/80/1b/b8/82.
pdf. 
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feelings of inferiority28 if it could simply have said that any use of race is 
unconstitutional.  How much simpler and less controversial it would have 
been, both within the Court and outside it, to have avoided the dicey empirical 
link between segregation and inequality that gave rise to so much criticism of 
the Court’s legitimacy?  What the Court felt it had to defend, however, was 
how the use of race in the setting of Brown created the type of inequality that 
the Constitution forbids.  That core question, inexplicably, has now been 
eliminated from the analysis. 
If the current hijackers of Brown are willing to defy common sense, 
constitutional text, original meaning and history so flagrantly to claim Brown 
in support of their preferred social policy of race neutrality, then it is hard to 
see how anything the Court could have done differently in 1954 would be 
immune to the same misuse.  Even if the NAACP had taken what seemed the 
less radical approach to Brown, and the Court had resolved the case by 
launching a nationwide case-by-case examination of the equality of individual 
schools, there is no reason to believe we would be any closer to the goal of 
equality than we are today. 
This is precisely the issue that faced the NAACP Legal Defense Fund as its 
lawyers prepared to bring and argue the issue of school segregation, and it 
leads to the second, longer, reason I suggest we should not second-guess the 
Brown approach.  In the months leading up to the oral argument in Brown v. 
Board, there was a difference of opinion within the NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund about what position it should take in Brown—should it ask the Supreme 
Court to overrule Plessy v. Ferguson or should it take the more cautious 
approach of arguing simply that Linda Brown’s education was not equal based 
on the facts in Topeka?29 
Thurgood Marshall, the lead attorney for the Legal Defense Fund, 
prevailed internally in advocating the more aggressive approach, as his petition 
asking the Supreme Court to take the Brown case demonstrated.  That brief 
declared, 
Segregation as practiced in America has been “universally understood” to 
impose on Negroes this badge of inferiority, and the contrary dictum in Plessy 
v. Ferguson can no longer stand in the face of the wealth of evidence flatly 
contradicting it.30 
This statement underscores the correctness of Professor Strauss’s argument 
regarding what the Supreme Court in Brown understood the issue to be in the 
 
 28. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954). 
 29. JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE 
AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY 7 (2001); see generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 536–39 
(1975) (discussing Thurgood Marshall’s consultations and brainstorming prior to asking the 
Court to prohibit segregation). 
 30. KLUGER, supra note 29, at 540. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] COMMON INTERESTS AND INTEGRATION 1137 
case—whether the reality of segregation, as practiced in 1950s America, could 
reasonably stand alongside any meaningful conception of equality.31 
In light of subsequent developments, it may be tempting to say that 
Marshall made the wrong strategic choice.  Perhaps all of the troubling 
implications of the so-called “color-blind” approach to racial justice as we see 
them played out in the recent cases, culminating in the Parents Involved case 
in Seattle, could perhaps have been avoided if the Supreme Court had simply 
put some teeth into the “equal” component of “separate but equal,” rather than 
targeting solely the separation by race as the focus of its condemnation.  
Perhaps the Court might have made clear that it is not the use of race, or 
distinctions based on race, but rather any resulting inequality, that the 
Constitution forbids, if the argument had been pitched the other way.  That 
would have paved the way for remedial uses of race that do not exacerbate 
racial subordination, but rather seek to ameliorate it. 
Many years after the argument in Brown, I was fortunate enough to have 
occasion to ask Thurgood Marshall, by then a Supreme Court Justice himself, 
about this important strategy choice that he had made as a litigant before the 
Court.  I half-expected a flowery, dewy-eyed answer intoning the principle of 
equality, the expressive value of the law resounding throughout the land, or 
some such idealistic abstraction about his decision to urge the overruling of 
Plessy.  But I should have known Justice Marshall better than that.  In his truly 
inimitable, earthy style, with a gravelly voice revealing deep conviction 
underneath, this is what he said: 
You can’t have decent education without money.  Who had the money?  The 
white folks.  No way were they ever going to give it to the Negroes, no matter 
what a court told them to do.  There are just too many ways around that kind of 
order, to make the schools “equal.”  The only way to get the white folks to give 
us decent schools was to make it be their schools too.32 
This pragmatic and commonsense insight, so typical of Justice Marshall, 
reflects understated intellectual sophistication, also typical of him. 
What Justice Marshall had described was the idea of tying the interests of 
those without political power to those who possess it, in order to enhance the 
quality of the outcome of social policy for all.  This is an idea that is older than 
the Constitution itself.  Even before the Revolutionary War, the lack of 
universal suffrage in England was typically justified on the notion of virtual 
representation—the idea that common interests would permit those who did 
have a vote to protect the interests of those who did not.33  As long as the 
 
 31. Strauss, supra note 9, at 1070. 
 32. Personal communication with Justice Thurgood Marshall, in Washington, D.C. (1985). 
 33. See HANNA F. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 175 (1967).  I have raised 
this point in an earlier essay, Rebecca L. Brown, A Commentary: Calming Brown’s Critics, Still 
Queasy After All These Years, 70 PEABODY J. EDUC. 33, 36 (2004). 
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represented and unrepresented shared a common interest, the self-interest of 
the voters would protect the interest of the non-voters.  This idea was 
considered one of the most important protectors of liberty under British 
constitutionalism.34 
A version of the idea survived in the American constitutional system of 
representation, described by James Madison as the “communion of interests 
and sympathy of sentiments of which few governments have furnished 
examples; but without which every government degenerates into tyranny.”35  
Scholarly literature, particularly the seminal work of John Hart Ely, 
demonstrates that linking the interests of representatives, along with the 
majorities that support them, to the interests of political minorities, is necessary 
to preserve both equality and liberty.36  Our national mantra, to the effect that 
no one is above the law, reflects a deep commitment to the principle that those 
charged with making and enforcing the laws will do a better job of it if they 
know that they and their friends are subject to those same laws along with 
everyone else.  Similarly, the Thurgood Marshall idea goes, those who have 
the power and resources to fund and design public education will do a better 
job if they know that their own children will attend the schools they are 
shaping.37 
Thus, the NAACP’s decision to seek to overrule Plessy, rather than asking 
the Court to apply the separate-but-equal doctrine to public education in a 
more meaningful way, was profoundly consistent with constitutional tradition 
and commitment, even echoing the Constitution’s treatment of democratic 
representation itself.  It sought to bridge the seemingly insurmountable we-they 
divide of racial prejudice by means of a structural device that harnesses the 
power of self-interest in the service of the common good.  Once we are all in 
the same boat, so to speak, common incentives prevail and equality follows.  If 
we allow ourselves to be divided among different boats, the structural 
incentive for equality disappears. 
This justification for the integration of schools is not often heard in the 
public discourse regarding affirmative action, but it has profound relevance to 
the race issues still facing today’s public schools.  It is clear that one of the 
concerns that lead districts like Seattle to take race into account is a worry 
about the increase of de facto segregation in housing and the discrepancies that 
 
 34. See Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, the New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1513 (2002) 
(elaborating this argument). 
 35. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 291 (James Madison) (Gary Wills ed., 1982). 
 36. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (setting forth a 
“representation-reinforcing theory of judicial review”). 
 37. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
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such segregation can create with regard to the resources available to the public 
schools.38 
Although the separation by race in schools may no longer be mandated by 
state law, the resource discrepancy that arises from the increasingly segregated 
housing patterns in many modern cities goes to the very heart of what Brown 
was about.39  The disparity of resources undermines the institutional promises 
of our democracy and stifles hope for true equality in educational opportunity.  
Justice Marshall would have laughed out loud at the hypothesis that a hands-
off approach to resegregation in the allocation of state resources could lay any 
plausible claim to government color blindness.  When the problem is viewed 
this way, as Professor Strauss implies, it is surprising that programs like those 
struck down last term in Seattle and Louisville are not constitutionally required 
by an honest reading of Brown, let alone permitted by it when the districts seek 
to employ them on a voluntary basis. 
Notice that this understanding of integration sees it not as an end, but as a 
means—a means employing the basic principles of democracy and common 
good to achieve better outcomes for all.  It is an instrumental view of racial 
integration.  Importantly, a common defense of affirmative action today, 
including the majority opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger,40 upholding a plan 
designed to increase racial diversity in the Michigan Law School, argues that 
integration is an end: Education is better for all if it exposes students to people 
of different races and backgrounds.41  That is a modern argument, made 
possible, I think, by the strides of progress we have made in the aftermath of 
Brown.  It is hard to imagine that anyone in 1954 could effectively have argued 
that it was better for children to learn side-by-side with those of different races.  
Indeed, it was abhorrence of that very image that fueled much of the violent 
protest against school desegregation.  But having been told for half a century 
that we must be in the same boat, we have experienced an ameliorative effect 
on the we-they divide. 
There is a rightness about the integration model that speaks to who we are 
as a nation in a way that separate-but-equal never could.  Our Constitution is a 
document filled with devices that seek to channel self-interest toward the 
common good.  The Framers recognized that allowing different groups to 
divide into factions leads to loss of liberty for all, while requiring cooperation 
among them offers hope for both equality and liberty.  This is the insight that 
Thurgood Marshall propounded when he asked the Supreme Court to overrule 
 
 38. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 
2738, 2791 (2007). 
 39. See id. at 2801–02, app. A (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 40. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 41. Id. at 330. 
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the separate-but-equal doctrine, and this is the insight that the Supreme Court 
internalized when it invalidated the divisive practice of school segregation. 
Notwithstanding many continuing disappointments, this gives us 
something to celebrate in the 50th anniversaries of Brown and Cooper.  The 
courageous refusal of the Court to ignore the real-world effects of segregation, 
and of the NAACP lawyers to allow them to do so, left us with at least the 
continued aspiration to the possibility of a self-perpetuating equality.  The 
courts would be used to wedge us all into the same boat, on the hope that the 
quality of the ride would then take care of itself.  The decree of Brown, for all 
its absoluteness and susceptibility to mischaracterization, built its edifice of 
racial integration upon a foundation as old as the ideas underlying our 
Constitution, including the conviction that, for democracy to succeed, we must 
sink or swim together. 
 
